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Creditors' Rights and Security Transactions-

1962 Tennessee Survey
Forrest W. Lacey*
I. UstY
II. USE OF CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE

I. UsuRy
Three of the cases in this area involve usury problems. Tanner v.

Mobley1 presented the problem of who may bring an action to recover

usury. The plaintiff in the action, brought to recover usury and purge

a trust deed and note of usury, was the daughter-in-law and grantee of
the maker of the note and trust deed. The note and trust deed were
executed in 1952. In 1954 the property covered by the trust deed was
conveyed to plaintiff in consideration of her promise to pay the note

and care for the grantor. Plaintiff continued to make payments on the
note for several years after the death of grantor in 1955.
In affirming the action of the lower court in holding that plaintiff

could not maintain the action, the court relied upon Tennessee Code
Annotated section 47-1617 and several prior cases. The Code section
provides:
If usurious interest has been paid, the same may be recovered by action,
at the suit of the party from whom it was taken, or his representative; or it
may be subjected by any judgment creditor of such party to the satisfaction
of his debt.

The opinion quotes from an earlier case: 3
"The reason and policy of the statute against usury is the protection of
borrowers against the oppressive exactions of money lenders, and, to promote
and sustain that policy, it is not necessary that other persons than the victim,
or those standing in legal privity with him, should be given the benefit of all
the statute."4
*Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. 209 Tenn. 490, 354 S.W.2d 446 (1962).
2. A similar problem was considered in Post Sign Co. v. Jemo's, Inc., 48 Tenn. App.
13, 342 S.W.2d 385 (E.S. 1960), discussed in Lacey, Creditors' Rights and Security
Transactions-1961 Tennessee Survey, 14 V"D. L. z-v. 1217 (1961).
3. Parker v. Bethel Hotel Co., 96 Tenn. 252, 34 S.W. 209 (1896).
4. 354 S.W.2d at 448-49.
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The court then conceded that "The courts of the country are by no
means in unanimity on who are ... those who are standing in legal
privity with the borrower." 5 However, the opinion continues:
Clearly, in such a situation the grantee in this deed does not come within
that class of people or representatives as hereinbefore set forth that are
entitled to recover this usury or purge an instrument from a usurious taint. 6

Adams v. Schwartz7 deals with the problem of what constitutes
usury. In this case, brought by the maker of a series of notes to purge
them of usury, the plaintiff had originally given a series of bearer
notes to a contractor as consideration for the construction of a house.
The contractor, being in need of money to build the house, tried to
sell the original notes, but was unable to do so. His agent, not knowing about the first set of notes, prepared another set and contacted
defendant, who agreed to buy the notes, which had a face value of
$7000, for $4500. The transaction was consumated. The defendant
contended that he was a good faith purchaser of the notes. The lower
court, in holding that the transaction was usurious and ordering the
notes purged of usury, found that the transaction was not a purchase
of the notes but a loan, and that defendant was not a holder in due
course of the notes.
On appeal, it was held that the evidence supported these findings.
The holding was affirmed, with the court quoting the applicable law to
be:
"As we understand the law of this state, on the subject of usury, no

scheme or device to avoid the application of statutes on that subject, however ingenious or intricate same may be, will permit anyone guilty of participating in a usurious transaction to escape its consequences, when the facts
are made to appear; and consent or cooperation of the one paying the usurious interest is immaterial. Also while it is permissible for anyone to buy at a
discount negotiable paper which has already been issued, and in the capacity

of an innocent purchaser for value and without notice, collect the full amount

of such negotiable paper, even though there was usury in its inception
(Bradshaw v. Van Valkenburg, 97 Tenn. 316, 37 S.W. 88); nevertheless,
for this rule to apply, such paper must have been previously in the hands

of some other holder from or through whom same is acquired; or at least, such

purchaser must have reasonable grounds for believing that such former

holder existed."8

In Adams v. Schwartz, although there is no discussion of the admissibility of parol evidence, such evidence must have been admitted
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 448.
Id. at 449.
356 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).

Id. at 601, quoting Providence A.M.E. Church v. Sauer, 45 Tenn. App. 287, 303,

323 S.W.2d 6, 13 (W.S. 1958).
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because the usury was not apparent from the face of the note. The
court emphasized that usury could always be ferreted out.
If the contract is in truth and fact a loan of money at usurious rates, it
matters not what devices may be resorted to for the purpose of concealing
its true character, the law vill strip from it these devices, and adjudge it by
what it is in fact, rather than by what it may in its terms appear to be.9

In contrast to this judicial attitude is that of the court in Rush v.
ChattanoogaDu Pont Employees' Credit Union.10 The Credit Union
sued a co-maker of a note which provided for "interest on the unpaid
balance at the rate of one per cent per month." The defendant filed a
sworn plea of usury, in that the note called for interest in excess of
the legal rate. The only witness testified merely as to the amount due
on the note. The trial court allowed recovery, apparently on the
theory that the case was governed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 45-1820, which provides that "[T]he total of interest and all other
charges for a loan shall not exceed one per cent (1%) per month on
the unpaid balance...."
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, holding
that the note was usurious on its face. But the case was remanded for
further proof on the authority of Miller v. State," which the court of
appeals interpreted as permitting evidence to show that the apparent
charge of one per cent interest included other charges and was therefore legal. The opinion in the Miller case states: "The officer of the
credit union testifies that this 1% as shown on the note included all
charges of making the
loan and the interest. This being true the note
"12
was not usurious ....
On appeal the supreme court reversed the decision of the court of
appeals, and dismissed the case. It held that the quoted portion of the
Miller case was dictum and not authority. As authority for holding
that parol evidence was not admissible to show that the stated one
per cent included other charges, the opinion quoted Corpus Juris Secundum to the effect that: 'Tarol evidence is not admissible to show
...that interest was to be paid at a rate other than that expressed in
the instrument."3 (Emphasis by the court). The dissenting opinion
also quoted Corpus Juris Secundum as authority for the admissibility
of parol evidence. 14
9. Id. at 600.
10. 358 S.W.2d 333 (Tenn. 1962).

11.
12.
13.
14.

195 Tenn. 181, 258 S.W.2d 751 (1953).
195 Tenn. at 185, 258 S.W.2d at 753.
358 S.W.2d at 336-37 quoting 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 895 (1942).
Id. at 338.
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II. USE OF CiuDrr LIFE INSURANCE
The final case under survey, Kincaid v. Alderson,5 presents an interesting and apparently novel question. In 1958 Alderson and his
wife executed a chattel mortgage on a mobile home to secure payment
to a finance company of a note for $6,439, payable in monthly installments over a period of five years. The amount of these payments
included a premium on an insurance policy, payable to the finance
company, on the life of Alderson, in an amount equal to the unpaid
balance on the note. In January of 1960 the Kincaids purchased the
mobile home from the Aldersons for $600 and a promise to assume
and pay the monthly installments due on the note. The sellers gave
the purchasers a title bond which provided:
When the parties of the second part shall have paid in full the amount due
the Commercial Credit Corporation and said purchase money chattel mortgage is cancelled, . . . said parties of the first part make, execute and deliver

unto the said parties of the second part or their assigns a good and sufficient
bill of sale and title .. 16

In September of 1960 Alderson was killed and the insurance company
paid the finance company the balance due on the note. The Kincaids
then brought this action to clear their title to the mobile home, requesting that Mrs. Alderson directly, or through the court, execute to
them a clear title. The chancellor sustained a demurrer to the bill
on the ground that the condition in the title bond, i.e., payment by
the purchasers, had not been performed.
In affirming the decision, the supreme court reasoned that after
the purchasers assumed the mortgage they became primarily liable for
the debt, and the Aldersons then became sureties. This step seems
clear. The court went on to state, however, that as sureties Alderson's
estate and his wife are subrogated to the rights of the finance company. This proposition is questionable.
The general rule is that a surety is entitled to subrogation,V (or
reimbursement, 18 for that matter) only if or to the extent that the
surety paid the obligation. In this case the insurance company paid
the obligation.
Two authorities were relied upon by the court. The first, the Restatement of the Law of Security, section 104, clearly is referring to
the situation where the surety was paid. Thus it does not appear to
15. 209 Tenn. 608, 354 S.W.2d 775 (1962).
16. 354 S.W.2d at 775.
17. B.rsTATENmENT, SEcuBrtY § 141 (1941).
18. Id. § 104. See Henegar v. Brannon, 24 Tenn. App. 1, 137 S.W.2d 889 (M.S.
1939), in which reimbursement was denied to a surety where payment was made by
one other than the surety.
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be applicable. The other is an admitted dictum in a court of appeals
case, Moneymaker v. Calloway.19 The court states that the Moneymaker case is the only case they found anywhere near the factual
situation of the case under discussion. In that case Moneymaker
contracted to buy a car on installment payments, and to take out an
insurance policy on his life payable to the dealer. Actually Moneymaker's sister-in-law, Calloway, took possession of the car, paid the
down-payment and the installments and the premium for the insurance
policy. When Moneymaker died the insurance company paid into
court the balance due. It was held that Calloway was entitled to the
car and to the fund from the policy, which was ordered paid to the
dealer. Thus the actual holding in the Moneymaker case would
indicate that in the instant case the purchasers, the Kincaids, should
get the benefit of the payment by the insurance company. However,
in the Moneymaker case the court did say:
If the administrator of the estate of .

.

. Moneymaker has any claim to

this money, he must work it out in one of two ways. First . . . second, he
may claim his intestate was secondarily, and not primarily, liable for the

debt, and since his intestate paid the debt he is entitled to recover it from
Lucy Calloway, for the reason she was primarily liable for the debt. No

attempt has been made to show facts which would justify the Court in decreeing against Lucy Calloway on this last theory .... 20
This dictum does support the holding in the Kincaid case, but it also
assumes that the surety paid, which is not literally true.
The court recognized that Alderson had no rights under the insurance policy, because in response to a contention that the Kincaids
were assignees of Alderson's rights under the policy, the opinion
states:
[T]he Aldersons had nothing to assign. The life insurance was written for
the benefit of the Commercial Credit Corporation. They were the bene-

ficiaries of the insurance on Alderson, and Alderson had nothing to assign
21
and by any contract that he made he couldn't make such an assignment.

If the insured had no assignable rights under the policy, surely when
the insurance company pays it cannot be said that the insured pays.
Although the opinion in the Kincaid case did not cite it, a somewhat
similar decision is Tighe v. Walton.22 In the Tighe case a deed of
trust of real property was given as security for a loan, and a life
insurance policy on the life of the borrower was obtained. The lender
19. 9 Tenn. App. 348 (E.S. 1928).

20. Id. at 350.
21. 354 S.W.2d at 779.

22. 233 Miss. 781, 103 So. 2d 8 (1958).
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was first beneficiary. The amount of the policy was not stated in the
opinion. Later the land was sold, first to a non-assuming grantee, and
by him to a purchaser who assumed payment of the secured debt.
The original grantor died and the insurance company paid the lender,
who transferred the note and deed of trust to the wife of the insured.
It was held that the wife was entitled to be subrogated to the rights
of the lender who had been paid.
Although the same result was reached in both cases, the Tighe case
is readily distinguishable from the Kincaid case. First, in Tighe the
assuming grantee did not know of the life insurance. Second, he did
not assume an obligation to pay the premiums on the insurance, as the
Kincaids did. Third, in Tighe the estate of the insured was designated
as a second beneficiary, whereas in the Kincaid case the court found
no assignable interest in the insured.
If subrogation does not afford a satisfactory basis for deciding this
case, what should the result be? The increasing use of insurance on
the life of the debtor as security for payment of the debt would
indicate that the problem of the instant case could become a common
one. It seems desirable that the parties should control the result,
which they can do either in the original contract or the later one
whereby the rights and duties of the original debtor are assumed by
another. If, as is frequently the case, premiums on the insurance
policy are part of the periodic installment payments, surely the one
assuming the debt would expect to benefit from the insurance as he
is the one who is paying the premiums. However, it would also seem
that he would prefer that the insurance be transferred to cover his
life, as he is now the principal debtor.

